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1. Types of Opposition to Vegetarianism 
Although supporters of vegetarianism (and animals' 
interests in general) come in many varieties, we may 
distinguish two groups. First, utilitarians such as Singer 
base their argument on the suffering that factory farming 
causes to nonhumans and the absence of comparable 
benefits to humans. l Second, the animal rights view, as 
expressed by Regan, extends Kant's respect for persons 
principle to include nonhumans and argues that meat 
eating wrongly treats nonhumans merely as means.2 
Similarly, I find it useful to distinguish two types 
of defense of meat eating. My division is based on 
how each group responds to Singer's demand that we 
extend the equal consideration of interests principle3 
to include nonhumans and to his parallel between 
speciesism and, on the other hand, racism and sexism. 
Some grant Singer's premise that nonhumans do 
deserve equal consideration of interests, but they argue 
either that animals actually benefit from being raised 
on farms or that their suffering is outweighed by 
human gains. Others, paralleling Regan's rights 
approach, reject utilitarian calculations of interests. 
However, thcy argue, in direct opposition to Regan, 
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that animals' interests are qualitatively less important 
than those of humans or even that animals' interests 
are not morally significant at all. While we should not 
gratuitously cause them suffering, we may use them 
as we wish in order to benefit ourselves. In contrast to 
utilitarian defenders of meat eating, I call this second 
group "human supremacists." 
My goal in this paper is to argue that neither type of 
defense of meat eating is successful against Singer's 
utilitarian argument for vegetarianism. Instead of 
attempting a comprehensive response to all defenses 
that fall into these two categories, I will focus on what 
I consider to be the most powerful, representative ones. 
I have confined myself to Singer's argument for the 
strategic reason that it requires only that we extend 
moral concern to all sentient beings. Sceptics are more 
likely to grant this premise than they are to accept 
Regan's persuasively argued but more controversial 
view that all animals have an intrinsic value that may 
not be sacrificed in the course of utilitarian caIcuIations.4 
2. Utilitarian Defenses of Meat Eating 
In this section, I am iIllerested in those who try to justify 
meat eating on Singer's own utilitarian tenns. They 
agree, that is, that to attempt to justify meat eating by 
simply asserting that humans are superior to nonhumans 
is speciesist and that it is incumbent on them to explain 
PHILOSOPHY 
90 Summer & Fall 1995 
A Utilitarian Argument for Vegetarianism 
how human gains from meat eating outweigh non­
human suffering. I will focus mainly on RG. Frey's 
justification of meat eating in his book,Rights, Killing, 
and Suffering.5 Frey takes Singer's challenge seriously 
and gives a careful, detailed response.. 
Frey defends the strategy of the "concerned 
individual," who continues to eat meat but tries to 
refonn fanning techniques in order to eliminate cruelty 
to fann animals. He argues that Singer's demand for 
the end of factory fanning is based on the implausible 
"single experience" view of suffering: meat eating is 
wrong if it causes any suffering at all to fann animals. 
Frey proposes that we adopt instead the "miserable life" 
view of suffering, according to which we may be 
justified in causing animals some pain in order to raise 
them for food, as long as we ensure that their lives are 
on balance more pleasant tllan painfuL He points out 
that the "single experience" view of suffering would 
almost certainly have the absurd consequence that 
raising human children would also be wrong, since it 
would be practically impossible to eliminate all 
suffering from their lives.6 
Frey is correct when he argues that the "miserable 
life" view of suffering is superior to the "single 
experience" view. However, his argument neglccts a 
third option that is more salutary than either of the ones 
he considers. I will call this third option fue "minimal 
suffering" view. Granted, the "single experience" view 
is too stringent, but his "miserable life" view has the 
opposite fault ofbeing too lenient. It is itself vulnerable 
to a reductio: it would justify even the gratuitous 
infliction of suffering on our children, as long as the 
suffering is just barely outweighed by the pleasure they 
experience. Far more plausible is my "minimal 
suffering" view, which pennits the infliction of suffering 
only when doing so prevents even greater suffering or 
when it is a deserved punishment for past behavior. 
Abusing children (while carefully ensuring that their 
overall happiness outweighs their suffering) is 
repugnant, because it does not serve any legitimate 
punitive purpose or prevent even greater long-term 
suffering, either for our children or ourselves. Similarly, 
the suffering caused to animals when we raise tllem 
for meat is justified only if they deserve it (which is 
clearly not the case) or if it helps to prevent even 
greater suffering. Consequently, the burden is on Frey 
to show what the benefits of continuing to raise 
animals for meat are and bow they outweigh the 
suffering caused to animals. 
Frey argues that ilic concerned individual's tactic is 
sufficiently effective in reducing animals' suffering to 
justify continuing to raise animals for meat. Throughout 
his book, Frey takes advantage of a concession that 
Singer makes: the equal consideration of interests 
principle does not necessarily condemn all meat 
fanning, since animals raised on free range farms (and, 
we may suppose, on ilie kind of refonned farms that 
Frey proposes)? may avoid much of ilie suffering for 
which Singer condemns factory farms. However, Singer 
questions whether even free range fanns would reduce 
animals' suffering to a level that would be outweighed 
by humans' gains and whether, even if iliey did so, iliey 
would be economically feasible. 8 Moreover, be points 
out that the pertinent issue is whether we may eat today s 
meat, most of which is raised on factory farms.9 In any 
event, even ifFrey were able to show that the concerned 
individual's tactic and vegetarianism would have 
equally good consequences for the animals, his 
argument for continuing to raise animals for meat would 
still depend on showing that doing so would have better 
consequencesfor humans than vegetarianism. 
Before we turn to Frey's answer to this challenge, 
let us examine another utilitarian defense ofmeat eating 
that gocs even further ilian Frey's and argues iliat our 
practice ofraising animals on fanns benefits the animals 
tbcmselves. Farm animals have become domesticated, 
so the argument goes, and would be unable to survive 
in nature, were we to set them free. If exposed to life in 
the wild-bitter winters, savage predators, etC.-farm 
animals would be likely to die slowly and painfully from 
starvation, or quickly and savagely at ilie bands of 
wolves and bear. As long as we follow Frey's concerned 
individual's tactic and refonn our farming practices to 
give animals long and peaceful lives, we are actually 
doing them a favor. A life that is overall pleasurable, 
even iliough it migbt contain some pain, is preferable 
to no life at all, which is the likely consequence of 
ending meat farming. 
This "animal husbandry" argument can draw support 
from an unexpected source: J. Baird CallicoU's defense 
of a "land ethic." He criticizes supporters of animal 
rights for ignoring the vital distinction between wild 
and domestic animals. 10 He argues that none of tlle 
likely outcomes of our ceasing to raise animals for meat 
are favorable to the animals themselves. Unused to 
fending for themselves in competition with oilier wild 
animals, domestic animals are likely to become extinct. 
and we might consider it more humane simply to allow 
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existing farm animals to die peacefully on fanns than 
to put them at the mercy of predators. Callicott 
comments on the irony of the liberation of domestic 
animals resulting in their extinction. l1 
I follow Bart Gruzalski in biting the bullet in 
response Lo this reductio ad absurdum argument. 12 The 
discontinuation ofmeat farming will likely result in the 
replacement of domestic by wild animals. But this is 
an advantage, since it will result in an increase in the 
total amount of pleasure experienced by nonhuman 
animals. First, even if the adoption of Frey's concerned 
individual's tactic makes domestic animals' lives 
pleasurable, this pleasure will be replaced by that of 
the additional wild animals that will flourish on the land 
previously used for grazing on fanns. l3 Second, wild 
animals live more pleasurable lives than domestic ones. 
Gruzalski points out that no amount of modification of 
our current farming practices will eliminate the 
frustration of animals' natural urges and instincts, in 
tenus ofmovement, social organization, and diet. Thus, 
it isn't clear that animals raised in the manner proposed 
by Frey's "concerned individual" have lives that are on 
balance pleasurable. In contrast, while wild animals can 
indeed suffer painful "natural" deaths from predators, 
these deaths aLleast avoid the additional terror caused 
by the unfamiliar environment of the slaughterhouse. 
And some wild animals die peacefully of old age, thus 
avoiding any terror at alL 
We slill need to address another of Callicott's 
objections, which is also based on the distinction 
between domestic and wild animals. Argument'> (such 
as Gruzalski's) that claim that meat fanning frustrates 
animals' "natural desires" neglect the fact that "human 
artifacts" such as domestic animals do not have a nature 
that can be violated. 
It would make almost as much sense Lo speak 
of the natural behavior of tables and chairs. 14 
In response, Gruzalski cites experts who believe that 
the natural, instinctive urges and behavioral
 
patterns... of... ancestral wild species have
 
been little, if at all, bred out in the process of
 
domestication. I5
 
In the face of this stalemate on the nature of domestic 
ammals, we may reasonably err on the side of caution 
and place the burden of proof on those who would use 
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animals for food. In any event, the animal husbandry 
argument has been neutralized, since its goal was to 
show that meat farming is beneficial to animals, and 
we have seen that the replacement of farm animals by 
wild animals would create at least as much happiness 
as is currently experienced by farm animals. 16 
Moreover, even if we concede that domestic animals 
have no natural instincts that could be violated, our 
utilitarian approach still favors a world in which wild 
animals flourish in the place of domestic animals, since 
animals that both have a nature and live in nature 
arguably have richer, more fulfilling lives. 
Those who go beyond the utilitarian framework used 
in this paper can further criticize the confmement of 
animals on meat farms by citing Regan's view that 
raising animals on farms violates their inherent value, 
by treating them only as a means. Even though he 
rejects Singer's and Regan's approach, Callicott 
himself gives a nonutilitarian reason against factory 
farming, namely that it involves "the monstrous 
transformation of living things from an organic to a 
mechanical mode ofbeing."17 
The foregoing discussion suggests that nonhuman 
animals would be better off ifwe completely ended meat 
farming than if we followed the tactic of Frey's 
concerned individual. Consequently, the justifiability 
of the concerned individual's tactic hinges on sbowing 
that the benefits for humans of continuing to raise 
animals for meat outweigh its disutility for nonhumans. 
Let us tum at last to Frey's main argument. 
Frey bases bis utilitarian defense of meat farming 
on a detailed conjecture as to the bad economic 
consequences for humans of its cessation. 18 Frey 
predicts a massive loss of income and employment, 
not only for farmers but also for the vast number of 
people in meat-related industries. He also includes the 
loss of pleasure resulting from a decrease in such social 
activities as restaurant-going and barbecues. Since 
space does not permit detailed discussion of Frey's 
specific predictions, I will confine myself to a few 
general responses. 
First, Frey's argument is based on worst-case 
scenarios wbicb underestimate the new economic and 
social opportunities that will arise because of the need 
for enormously greater production of vegetarian food. 
For instance, the growing popularity of vegetarianism 
in the United States and, especially, in England bas led 
to a profusion of vegetarian restaurants, and most 
restaurants now offer vegetarian options. These 
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developments indicate that the gloomy predictions that 
Frey made twelve years ago about the future of the 
restaurant industry if meat eating were to be abandoned 
were unfounded. The fact that even MacDonalds has 
developed a vegetarian burger, and that supermarkets 
now stock a wide variety ofdifferent types of non-meat 
burgers and hot dogs, undermines Frey's claim that fast 
food restaurants would collapse and shows that 
barbecues could continue even ifwe gave up meat. More 
generally, Frey's claim that all vegetarian restaurants 
arc alike reflects the common myth that vegetarian 
cuisine is bland, a charge that is already belied by the 
imaginative menus available in such restaurants. 
Second, even granting that conversion to vegetar­
ianism would cause some economic hardship, and 
granting Frey's point that this hardship is commen­
surable with animals' suffering, 19 economic factors are 
unlikely to outweigh the physical and mental suffering 
that would remain for farm animals even if we reformed 
farming methods. By analogy, even a purely utilitarian 
approach, which forswears any reference to rights, 
would certainly not accept the economic arguments that 
could doubtless have been made in favor of child labor 
in the 19th. century. The children's suffering outweighs 
any financial gains that might have arisen from 
exploiting this source of cheap or free labor. 
Third, a consistent utilitarian approach must 
consider not only the potentially harmful effects for 
humans of giving up raising animals for meat but also 
its potential benefits for us. As weIl as the health benefits 
arising from giving up meat, we must take into account 
the fact that, as a far more efficient source of protein 
than a meat-based diet, a vegetarian diet may help 
substantially to alleviate the problem of world hunger.2o 
Now, rrey is aware of these arguments based on human 
welfare,21 and, reasonably enough, he decides to focus 
instead on arguments based on animal welfare, since 
these arguments have "recently given the question of 
vegetarianism a new focus."22 The problem for Frey is 
that the alleged harmful effects for humans of 
vegetarianism playa vital role in his response to the 
argument for vegetarianism based on animals' suffering. 
The structure ofhis argument is that, since the concerned 
individual's tactic is effective in reducing animals' 
suffering, the harmful effectsfor humans of giving up 
meat farming are sufficient to tilt the utilitarian balance 
against vegetarianism. Consequently, any beneficial 
effects of vegetarianism for humans are also directly 
relevant to Frey's utilitarian defense of meat farming, 
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yet he does not include these effects in his discussion 
of consequences. Only if he can show that the benefits 
for humans of meat farming outweigh its disutility for 
animals andfor humans has he successfully responded 
to Singer's utilitarian argument defended in this paper. 
In sum, Frey's argument, even if supplemented by 
the animal husbandry argument, fails to overcome the 
utilitarian case against raising animals for meat. Neither 
his contention that it will sufficiently reducc animals' 
suffering, nor his argument that it will have better results 
for humans than vegetarianism, have succeeded in 
making the case for the concerned individual's strategy. 
Consequently, the only certainties are that today's meat 
farming causes the animals considerable suffering and 
that discontinuing meat farming will end that suffering. 
3. Human Supremacism 
We have seen that meat eating is hard to justify on 
utilitarian grounds. Once we concede that the moral 
interests of nonhumans should be given equal weight 
alongside those of humans in our moral deliberations, 
human gains from meat eating appear trivial compared 
to animals' losses. At this point, many defenders ofmeat 
eating take a different tack and withdraw their assent 
from Singer's application of the equal consideration of 
interests principle to nonhumans. According to this 
position. which I call "human supremacism," humans' 
interests should count for more than those of non­
humans, making utilitarian comparisons of human and 
nonhuman gains and losses inappropriate. 
The issue at stake between utilitarian vegetarians 
such as Singer and. on the other hand, human 
supremacists is whether the morality of meat eating 
depends on a quantitative comparison between the gains 
and losses of humans and animals. Singer believes that 
it does and argues that giving preference to humans in 
spite of animals' greater interests is speciesist and, 
therefore, wrong. Human supremacists, in contrast, 
claim that a qualitative comparison is also needed. 
Because humans have greater inherent moral value than 
nonhumans, human interests should take precedence 
over those of animals. I devote this section to an 
examination of one such human supremacist view, that 
of Carl Cohen, who brazenly embraces the label of 
spedesist. His paper concerns medical experiments on 
animals, but I will consider its implications for 
vegetarianism.23 Cohen himselfclearly believes that his 
argument justifies meat eating, since he offers as a 
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reductio ad absurdum of arguments against medical 
research on animals the consequence that meat eating 
would also be wrong.24 
Speciesism is not analogous to racism and sexism, 
Cohen argues, because whereas no morally relevant 
distinctions exist between the races and sexes, the 
morally relevant differences between humans and 
nonhumans arc "enormous, and almost universally 
appreciated.,,25 Now, Singer would not deny that 
humans, because of their greater intelligence, have 
greater interests than do nonhumans. The equal 
consideration of interests principle requires not equal 
treatment but, rather, that like interests be given equal 
weight. Consequently, in situations in which humans' 
and nonhumans' interests clash, humans' greater 
interests will sometimes justify giving them preference. 
For example, since "[nlormal adult human beings have 
mental capacities that will, in certain circumstances, 
lead them to suffer more than animals would in the same 
circumstances,"26 we may sometimes be more justified 
in performing scientific experiments on nonhumans 
than on humans. Singer opposes meat farming, 
however, because our benefits are easily outweighed 
by animals' suffering. 
In contrast, Cohen flatly denies that "the pains of 
all animate beings must be counted equally"27 and 
even that nonhumans have any rights at all. On what 
qualities does Cohen base humans' alleged greater 
inherent moral value? 
Cohen believes that only beings that are capable of 
both claiming their own and respecting other beings' 
rights arc eligible for having rights: 
Humans confront choices that are purely
 
moral; humans~-but certainly not dogs or
 
mice-lay down moral laws, for others and
 
for themselves. Human beings are self­

legislative, morally auto-nomous.. .Animals
 
(that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary sense
 
of that word) lack this capacity for free moral
 
judgment. They are not beings of a kind
 
capable of exercising or responding to moral
 
claims. Animals therefore have no rights ... 28
 
Cohen does not deny that we do have duties towards 
nonhumans, even though they have no rights. In 
particular, we "are at least obliged to act humanely" 
towards animals, in view of their status as sentient 
creatures. But these obligations are imperfect, in the 
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sense that no animal has a right to be treated in this 
way. Cohen does not explain exactly what the extent of 
our imperfect obligations to animals is. At one point, 
he refers to the duty not to gratuitously harm sentient 
creatures. On the interpretation of "gratuitous" that I 
assume Cohen intends, this would rule out torturing 
animals for our pleasure but would permit virtually any 
of the currently common uses ofnonhumans, including 
meat eating and medical experiments. However, 
defenders of animal rights regard most ofthese common 
practices as gratuitous, because the sacrifices imposed 
on nonhumans are not outweighed by human gains. 
Consequently, Cohen's view, whatever its other merits, 
fails to give a clear criterion for determining which uses 
of nonhumans are justified. 
To his credit, Cohen deals directly with the most 
obvious objection to his account of rights. The objection, 
the so-called "argument from marginal cases," is that 
very young, severely retarded, or comatose humans 
would also fail to qualify if being able to exercise and 
respond to moral claims is a necessary condition for 
baving rights.29 They are not moral agents, since they 
are unable to reciprocate any moral conceru that we 
show towards them, nor are they able even to understand 
any mardI claims that may be made on their own behalf. 
But we do regard them as having rights, and we punish 
people, such as child abusers, who violate these rights.3O 
Cohen's response is that qualification for rights 
depends upon the "natural moral fnnctions" of the 
species. Members that, due to youth, birth defect'> or 
accidents, do not have these capacities are, as it were, 
carried through on the coattails of the rest of the species. 
The capacity for mom judgment that distin­
guishes humans from animals is not a test to 
be administered to human beings one by 
one...The issue is one ofkind.31 
All nonhuman animals, in contrast, simply lack the 
capacities that most humans have. The first problem 
with Cohen's response is that, while it produces the 
result he desires-humans have rights, and nonbumans 
don't-it amounts to an assertion rather than an 
argument. Exactly why should rights be based on the 
normal capacities of a species rather than on the 
capacities ofeach individual member? Second, his view 
seems to entail an absurd consequence. Suppose that 
one of the chimpanzees that have been taught sign 
language develops an ability to understand moral 
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arguments, to restrain its behavior in the light of these 
argument~, and to make moral claims on its own behalf. 
These abilities would remain far above the "naturnl 
moral functions" of chimpanzees as a species. 
Consequently, according to the view that bases rights 
upon the normal capacities of the species as a whole, 
lhis chimpanzee would have to be denied the Slatus of 
a right-holder. But this seems arbitrary and unfair. 
. None of this is to deny that humans' greater 
capacities sometimes give rise to special moral 
obligations towards them. For instance, because of their 
ability to make and respond to moral claims, I am able 
to make agreements and promises and to enjoy deep, 
mutually supportive relationships with healthy humans 
that are difficult or impossible with nonhumans or 
"marginal" humans. These agreements, promises and 
relationships make our moral ties to healthy adult 
humans more extensive and complex than those we have 
to nonhumans. But this does not preclude nonhumans 
from having rights, any more than the fact that I have 
special moral obligations towards some people, such 
as my friends and family members, precludes strangers 
from having moral rights thatllreatthem certain ways. 
Since I am defending Singer's utililarian view, my 
response to Cohen is not intended to show that animals 
have rights. My point, rather, is that nonhumans have 
as much claim to having rights as do humans and that 
the existence of special obligations towards healthy 
adult humans does not entail human supremacism. 
Similarly, I can concede other justified differences 
between the moral standing of healthy adult humans and 
nonhurnans, without resorting to human supremacism. 
'111e view that only self-conscious beings capable of 
futurc-oriented desires, especially the desire tOr continued 
life, can have a right to lifeJ2 can be justified on the 
utilitarian ground that persons' greatermental capacities, 
including their greater power of anticipation, mean that 
they would lose more than nonpersons from being killed. 
These human capacities that are not shared by 
nonhumans-e.g., the ability to make and respect moral 
claims and to form extensive future-oriented desires­
will sometimes act as a "tie-breaker"that justifies giving 
preference to humans-for instance, if we had to choose 
between feeding humans or a dog in a time of extreme 
shortage. However, ilie justification for giving 
preference to humans has nothing to do with humans' 
alleged greater inherent moral worth. It is, rather, that 
giving equal weight to the like interests ofhumans and 
nonhumans, an impartial utilitarian calculus requires 
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that we give preference to humans in iliese rare 
situations. The moral community is strengthened when, 
other things being equal, we give priority to beings 
capable of reciprocating our moral concern. And when 
either a human or a nonhuman has to suffer physically 
or die, humans' greater capacity for suffering will 
usually tilt the utilitarian balance in their favor. 
The situation is completely different when we 
consider the utilities involved in the debate over meat 
eating. Since we do not need meat to survive, we are 
not faced with the choice of imposing comparable 
suffering on either humans or nonhumans, and so 
humans' greater capacities are irrelevam to the tradeoff 
of interests involved. As we saw in the previous section, 
a quantilative comparison of rival interests shows that 
human gains are insufficient to justify ilie imposition 
of suffering on nonhumans. So, the only way to justify 
continuing to raise animals for food is to abandon the 
utilitarian approach that gives equal weight to the like 
interests of humans and nonhumans. But we have just 
seen that Cohen has failed to give a cogent reason for 
abandoning the utilitarian approach and regarding 
human interest~ as qualilatively more imporlant than 
those of nonhumans. Consequently, the human 
supremacist approach fails to dislodge our earlier 
conclusion that raising animals for food is wrong. 
4. Conclusion: Theory and Practice 
I have argued that the strongest utilitarian defense of 
raising animals for meat-Frey's---does not work and 
that the human supremacist attempt to sidestep 
utililarian calculations by attributing greater intrinsic 
moral worth to humans is unfounded. However, even 
if we accept that the discontinuation of raising animals 
for meat would have better results than following the 
concerned individual's lactic, Frey points out iliat a 
crucial step remains to be provided before any utilitarian 
argument can condemn meat eating. This step is 
showing that the act of becoming a vegelarian and 
encouraging others to do so will actually help to achieve 
the goal of the abolition of meat farming and, hence, 
produce better results than the concerned individual's 
tactic. Frey argues that the practical impact of anyone 
person's becoming a vegetarian will be negligible, given 
the vasrness of the meat industry in countries like the 
U.S.JJ In contrast, political action in order to reform 
farming practices to reduce animals' suffering is far 
more likely Lo produce tangible benefits. 
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In response, the private action of becoming a 
vegetarian in no way precludes political activism of 
precisely the kind that Frey supports. The only 
difference is that the activism would aim at the abolition, 
rather than the reform, of raising animals for meat. 
Additionally, while my becoming a vegetarian may have 
negligible effect, Frey dismisses too easily the impact 
of the combined effect of thousands of people's 
becoming vegetarians. Given the dramatic increase in 
vegetarian restaurants and vegetarian options within 
conventional restaurants in the twelve years since Frey's 
book appeared, we may plausibly claim that conversion 
to vegetarianism rcally has reduced the amount ofmeat 
that would otherwise have been produced and 
consumed. Finally, as vegetarianism becomes more 
"mainstream," it gains more credibility and power as 
a political force. 
My second response to Frey coneerns the morality 
of eating today's meat, the vast majority of which is 
raised on the very factory farms that he wants to reform. 
Agreat strength ofFrey's book is that he gives a detailed 
and sophisticated discussion of the charges ofinsincerity 
and inconsistency that we might level at the concerned 
individual, who, while campaigning for reform, 
continues to eat meat raised in a manner that he or she 
concedes causes unfair suffering to animals. 34 Frey 
responds plausibly enough by pointing out that 
demanding that we have ahsolutely no contact with a 
practice that we consider wrong is Wlduly rigid. For 
instancc, I can quite actively and consistently oppose 
my country's foreign policies, without leaving the 
country in order to express the extent ofmy disapproval. 
Similarly, argues Frey, as long as the concerned 
individual actively strives to reform cruel fanning 
practices, the fact that she continues to cat meat is proof 
of neither insincerity nor inconsistency. 
However, continuing to eat meat while striving for 
reform is different in a crucial respect from Frey's 
analogies. Remaining in a country and trying to change 
its policies from within is arguably far more effective 
than simply leaving the country and having no contact 
with it. In contrast, continuing to eat meat seems to have 
no positive impact on the effectiveness of the concerned 
individual's attempt to end cruel farming practices. On 
the contrary, a reduction in the demand for meat (which 
is the likely result of a temporary boycott by concerned 
individuals) would seem to create economic pressure 
on the meat industry that is likely to accelerate the 
desired reforms. Once the reforms have occurred, the 
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concerned individual may then resume eating meat So 
even the concerned individual is not justified in eating 
meat raised on today's factory farms. The concerned 
individual who continues to eat meat, even though she 
admits that it was produced in cruel conditions and that 
her eating meat will in no way enhance her efforts to 
improve these cruel conditions, seems to be guilty of a 
lack ofintegrity. 
In conclusion, my utilitarian argument that raising 
animals for meat is wrong does indeed demand a 
vegetarian diet. And even ifFrey were correct that trying 
to reform our practice ofraising animals for meatwould 
have better consequences than working for its abolition, 
eating the meat raised on today's factory fanns would 
still not be justified on utilitarian grounds. 
I am grateful to an anonymous referee, commen­
tatorAlex Wellington, Harlan Miller, and audience 
members for helpful suggestions. 
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Nicholas Dixon has organized his paper, "A Utilitarian 
Argument for Vegetarianism," around the positions for 
and against vegetarianism that are derived from the two 
main currents of traditional ethical theories­
utilitarianism and some variant of a rights-based 
approach. These currents are renected in the work of 
Peter Singer and Tom Regan, respectively and are taken 
up hy many others who write in the area. It is easy to 
understand why, in the context of his project of 
providing a utilitarian argument for vegetarianism, he 
chooses to limit the discussion to the two groups hc 
addresses-utilitarianism and "human supremacism." 
Yet, it leaves out an entire area of recent deliberation 
and debate concerning the moral imperative of 
vegetarianism, that which is presenlCd in conlCmporary 
ecofeminist thought. This is an area which deserves 
consideration, and not only for reasons of compre­
hensiveness, representation and inclusivity. It deserves 
consideration, also, and perhaps more importantly, 
because the issues addressed and points made by 
feminist writers on the topic speak directly to the need 
to combine "private decision with political action."2 
I wish to focus inSlCad on a third set of arguments 
that can provide---Dn some variantS-the basis for 
DISCUSSION 
Between the Species 98 
support for vegetarianism as well as a critical 
perspective on the positions taken by adherents of 
traditional ethical theories. Feminist approaches to the 
issue enable one to explore the relationship between 
theory and practice in our moral lives; indeed, they 
require one to address the question of connections 
between theory and practice. Ultimately as with all 
complex and sophisticated ethical theories, it has to be 
said that the introduction of feminist theorizing into 
the topic of vegetarianism does not lead to easy 
answers or simple remedies. It is both intellectually 
interesting and practically significant that just as one 
can find utilitarian arguments both for and against 
vegetarianism and rights-based arguments both for and 
against vegetarianism, there are a range of possible 
feminist positions on vegetarianism. 
There are many reasons for addressing the topic of 
vegetarianism from a feminist, or rather from feminist 
perspectives.3 For one thing, a remarkable proportion 
of the increasing number of vegetarians are women.4 
TIle emphasis in much feminist literature in ethics on 
the connection between life experience and values 
makes it worth examining the gender dimension of the 
so-called "vegetarian option."5 Further, a significant 
amount of recent writing on vegetarianism, in particular, 
has been produced by feminists, and there have been 
several very prominent and influential ecofeminist 
treatments of the issue which makc the case for the 
necessity of tlle connection.6 Popular literature on 
animal rights and vegetarianism often seems to assume 
that tllere is a simple and easy case to be made for allying 
feminism with vegetarianism. Carol Adams puts it 
succinctly and forcefUlly when she implies that the 
"values and beliefs imbedded in the choice to eat 
animals are antitlletical to feminism."7 
Recent articles, nevertheless, have touched on the 
tensions within feminist circles about the issue of 
endorsing vegan, or even vegetarian conferences and 
events.s Ecofeminists, specifically, contend that "in 
the case of meat eating, the personal is political"; yet, 
not all feminists accept this.9 Some feminists have 
even suggested that efforts to endorse vegetarianism 
are tantamount to cultural imperialism, and have the 
effect of undermining cultural traditions, in particular 
those of women of color. 1O Thus, some feminists are 
likely to feel a reluctance to advocate vegetarianism 
for several reasons: in order to avoid tlle accusation 
of cultural imperialism, oul of deference to cultural 
traditions, and not wanting to be perceived as 
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infringing on women's right" to choose. Some feminist 
theorists reject the claims of animal rights theory on 
other theoretical grounds. 
It might be helpful at this point to distinguish two 
disparate approaches to feminist ethics: one based on a 
"care ethic" and one based on an "anti-domination 
ethic."11 The fonner is derived from, and developed 
out of the work of psychologist Carol Gilligan, whose 
book In A Different Voice is widely read and whose 
ideas have become extremely influential. The latter can 
be found in the work of feminist theorists such as Carol 
Adams, Karen Warren, Lori Gruen and Kathryn Paxton 
George, among others. Simply put, the care ethic 
emphasizes tbe importance of relationsbips and 
emotional connections between beings, and the anti­
domination ethic advocates the "elimination ofany and 
all factors tbat contribute to tbe continued and 
systematic domination or subordination of women."12 
What I hope to show in this paper is that there is no 
neat and tidy relation between a particular approach to 
ethics and a stance on the moral imperative of 
vegetarianism. Some people think that a care ethic will 
support, or even require vegetarianism, others do not. 
And similarly, some people think that an anti­
domination ethic will support, or even require 
vegetarianism, but others do not. The importance ofan 
exploration of feminist perspectives on vegetarianism, 
I argue, docs not reside in whether or not the approach 
will produce the "right answer." The importance lies 
instead in the approach taken to moral reasoning. 
I will first discuss the claims made by Nell Noddings 
on behalf of a variant of care ethic and the positions 
she takes on human obligations towards animals derived 
from that ethic. Sbe finds that the development of her 
ethical perspective does not dovetail with the approach 
taken by eeofeminists and others. Next, I will examine 
the positions advocated by adherents of variants of an 
anti-domination ethic. I will flTst address those theorists 
wbo argue for an integral connection between feminism 
and vegetarianism. I will then look at the analysis 
presented by Kathryn Paxton George, who takes an anti­
domination approach but explicitly critiques tbe 
arguments of traditional ethical theory in favour of the 
"vegan ideal." It is clearly worth exploring why some 
feminists think vegetarianism is morally obligatory and 
others don't. It is also worth speculating on tbe 
implications of their approaches to moral reasoning, 
on their views about how moral thinking and feeling 
should proceed. 
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The care ethic is premised a "mode of thinking that is 
contextual and narrative rather than formal and 
abstract."13 Gilligan proposes that there is a different 
moral voice, one which tends to be articulated by 
women and tends to be empirically associated with 
women. This different moral voice is concerned with 
care and responsibility rather than with the focus of the 
dominant moral voice-rights and justice. The 
dominant moral voice, Gilligan claims, tends to be 
articulated by men and tends to be empirically 
associated with men. The ethic ofcare is thus contrasted 
with the ethic of rights and justice. In passing, I would 
like to point out that Gilligan sometimes writes as if 
one could simply combine utilitarianism and a 
deontological or rights-based approach to ethics in one 
position. Oilier authors, such as Josephine Donovan, 
who write about "animal rights theory" tend to use this 
term to cover both utilitarian and rights-based 
approaches. Needless to say, moral philosophers would 
resist this lumping and find it unhelpful at best. 
Nell Noddings' book Caring: A Feminine Approach 
to Ethics and Moral Education contains a chapter titled 
"Caring for Animals, Plants, Things and Ideas." In a 
passage in iliat chapter, Noddings makes clear that hcr 
"caring" ethic extends only to humans and that her 
approach to ethics would not result in a judgmental 
stance against raising animals for food, eating meat or 
oilier human uses of animals (sealing, hunting, fishing 
etc.). She says positive things about keeping pets, in 
part because of the benefits to humans in so doing. 
Similarly, spiders, toads and snakes are welcome in the 
garden due to their usefulness. As for rats, she says she 
would not torture a rat, and she would hesitate to use 
poisons on one, but she "would shoot it cleanly if the 
opportunity arose."14 Thus, her approach is really quite 
anthropocentric, a fact whicb she docs not try to deny. 
Noddings, ultimately, docs not accept the interpretation 
of speciesism found in animal rigbts theory. She says 
instead that "[iJt is not "speciesism" to respond 
differently to different species if the very form of 
response is species specific."15 
It is necessary to set her remarks in context in order 
to understand why she takes the position she docs. For 
Noddings, primary moral obligation is located in the 
domain of human life. The eiliicaI impulse or attitude, 
she says, is grounded in ilie caring relation. Caring, in 
tum, depends upon past experience and conscious 
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choice. 16 Caring is anchored in recognition of relations. 
Furthermore, our obligation to summon the caring 
attitude is limited by the possibility of reciprocity. I? 
Obligation, then, can only arise on encounter. IS As 
responsiveness or perceived responsiveness increases 
in the potential to be cared-forbeing, then SO does caring. 
What this means for animals is that affection for 
animals varies greatly across persons. Some people will 
have had past experiences-encounters with certain 
animals and they will choose to undertake a commit­
ment to that being. Such is the reason that Noddings 
herself perceives an obligation to her family pet, a cat 
who appears expectantly, stretches its neck, and 
vocalizes its need. 19 In response, Noddings feels 
obligated to that particular animal, and perhaps to others 
of its kind she encounters. But the obligation does not 
extend any further, and certainly not to animals in 
general. For Noddings, one cannot be obligated to the 
entire class of anirnals.2° 
Of course, other people will not have had past 
experiences or encounters with animals, nor will they 
choose to undertake any commitments to animals. In 
that case, they can hnrdly be said to have an obligation 
to any particular beings, on Noddings' account. They 
can be expected to avoid int1icting pain, since the one 
thing that Noddings' approach does require is that we 
must not inflict pain without justification. One must 
act to "prevent pain to consciousness, even the 
nonreflective consciousness of animals."21 According 
to Noddings, when the form of response of the being in 
question permits detection ofpain, then we as caregivers 
are obligated to relieve it. Noddings' version of a care 
ethic, then, seems to provide a rationale for a minimal 
obligation to refrain fmIll int1icting pain upon animals, 
although even that IIlay be qualified.22 It does not give 
rise to furtJler obligations to promote tJle welfare of 
animals, except insofar as particular caregivers choose 
to undertake a commitment to care for particular 
animals. It would not lead to judgmental stances 
prohibiting meat eating or the raising of animals for 
food or other reasons. 
I do not want to dwell on a discussion of the "care 
ethic," since I think that most arguments for 
vegetarianism t.."lat rest upon a feminist ethic depend 
upon the anti-domination version of feminist ethics. In 
addition, as I have already mentioned, at least one 
proponent of the care ethic version of feminist et1lics­
namely Nell Noddings-explicitly rcjects the idca that 
the carc ethic entails support for vegetarianism. 
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Donovan actually tries to combine elements of both the 
care ethic and the anti-domination ethic approaches to 
feminist ethics. I will now go on to discuss the anti­
domination versions of feminist ethics. 
ill 
In an article entitled "Animal Rights and Feminist 
Theory," Josephine Donovan sets out ilie case for a 
feminist or feminine eiliic to address ilie issue of the 
ethical treatment of animals. She claims iliat it is 
necessary to ground an ethic of concern for animals 
in what she calls "an emotional and spiritual 
conversation with nonhuman life-forms." She finds 
both utilitarianism and rights theories to be inadequate 
for this purpose, primarily due to the insistence ofmale 
moral philosophers that their positions are rooted in 
reason and not emotion. 
Donovan quotes Peter Singer's preface to Animal 
Liberation in which he recounts an anecdote about a 
visit to ilie home of a woman who claimed to love 
animals but who ate meat. He writes: ......certainly she 
was keen to talk about animals. 'I do love animals' , she 
began... and she was off. She paused while refresh­
ments were served, took a ham sandwich, and then 
asked us what pets we had.'>23 Donovan says that 
Singer's point "is not only to condemn the woman's 
hypocrisy in claiming to love animals willIe she was 
eating meat but also to dissociate himself from a 
sentimentalist approach to animal welfare."24 Singer 
then goes on to profess that he and his wife were not 
particularly interested in, nor fond ofanimals, that they 
did not 'love' animals. He says that the "portrayal of 
those who protest against cruelty to animals as 
sentimental, cmotional 'animal lovers' [has meant] 
excluding the entire issue... from serious political and 
moral discussion."25 Donovan takes Singer to be 
assuming that associating the cause of animal rights 
"with 'womanish' sentiment is to trivialize it."26 
Donovan goes on to propose that womcn animal 
rights theorists-here she includes people like Mary 
Midgley (author ofAnimals and Why They Matter) and 
Constantia Salamone (an activist)--have been able to 
develop theories which acknowledge and emphasize the 
importance of emotional bonding with animals. 
Midgley, for example, talks about the social and 
emotional complexity of animals and says: "[w]hat 
makes our fellow beings entitled to basic consideration 
is surely not intellectual capacity but emotional 
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fellowship."27 Salamone and other activists adopt a 
more explicitly feminist stance and condemn the 
"rationalist, rnasculinist bias of current animal rights 
theory," according to Donovan.28 
There are at least two ways in which emotion and 
emotional fellowship between humans and nonhuman 
animals could be relevant to the discussion of the ethical 
treatment of animals. One way in which it could be 
relevant is in providing reasons to treat animals with 
kinship. Thus, the biological affmity between humans 
and other animals could be seen to be at least partial 
justification for treating animals with equal concern and 
respect. If this is the intended interpretation, then the 
feminist position would simply echo the utilitarian 
position first formulated by Jeremy Bentham, who said 
"[t]he question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they 
talk? but, Can they sujJer?"29 
I would argue that this is not the import of feminist 
approaches presented by Donovan and others. 
Recognition of sentience or the capacity for suffering 
or enjoyment does not distinguish feminist approaches 
from utilitarian approaches. The issue that arises from 
the application of feminism to the question of the ethical 
treatment ofanimals is the role ofemotion in the process 
of ethical reasoning. I take Donovan's critical point to 
be that a feminist ethic for the treatment of animals is 
one that emerges out of "women's relational culture of 
caring and attentive love."3o She implies, then, that 
moral reasoning should attend to this culture and should 
incorporate a sensitivity to the affective dimension of 
our (meaning us humans) relations with animals as well 
as with each other.3l 
Carol Adams uses the phrase "traffic in animals" as 
a parallel to the term "traffic in women" to suggest the 
parallels. Lori Gruen emphasizes the social construction 
of the connection between women and animals, a 
connection created by patriarchy as a means of 
oppression. She says that "eeofeminists are committed 
to a reexamination and rejection of all forms of 
domination.,,32 She refers to the work of KMen Warren 
during the elaboration of her anti-domination ethical 
perspective. Karen Warren, in "The Power and Promise 
ofEcological Feminism," presents a critique of the role 
of conceptual frameworks in the logic of domination, a 
logic which has justified both the domination of nature 
and women by men. 
Warren argues that there are several significant 
features of oppressive conceptual frameworks including 
value dualisms and logic of domination. 33 Value 
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dualisms are disjunctive pairs which are seen as 
oppositional and exclusive and which place higher 
status, prestige and value on one disjunct rather than 
another. Examples include: mind/body, reason/emotion, 
male/female. A logic of domination is a structure of 
argumentation which leads to a justification of 
subordination. The justification rest~ on the grounds of 
characteristics-for example, rationality-which 
allegedly the dominant (e.g., men) have and the 
subordinate (e.g., women and nonhuman animals) 
supposedly lack. 34 
Warren argues that ecofeminism "involves an ethical 
shiftjrom granting moral consideration to nonhumans 
exclusively on the grounds of some similarity they share 
with humans (e.g., rationality, interests, moral agency, 
sentiency, right-holder statuS)."35 Warren implies that 
the shift is toward an approach which provides a 
contextual account, one which has several significant 
features: it "makes a central place for values of care, 
love, friendship, trust and appropriate reciprocity" and 
it "involves a reconception of what it means to be 
human, and in what human ethical behavior consists."36 
As with Donovan, it seems as if elements from the care 
ethic and the anti-domination ethic are being merged 
and combined. 
IV 
There is yet another feminist perspective on vegetar­
ianism and in particular, on the vegan ideal, which needs 
to be brought into the discussion, and that perspective 
can be found in the work of Kathryn Paxton George. 
George has taken a critical stance on the assumption 
that there is a simple connection between a feminist 
approach rooted in concern for social justice and the 
universalist prescription in favor of ethical veganism 
based on traditional moral theory. George has asked 
the question "Should feminists be vegetarians?" and 
her answer seems to be "Not necessarily." She argues 
that the vegan ideal is actually discriminatory because 
the arguments for it "presuppose a 'male physiological 
norm' that gives a privileged position to adult, middle­
class males living in industrialized countries."37 
George's concern is that people who are not adult, 
middle-class males living in industrialized countries 
cannot be expected to adopt vegetarian and vegan diets 
for a wbole series of reasons-baving to do with 
ecology, economy and nutrition. These people would 
thus have to be excused from the duty to attain the virtue 
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associated with ethical lifestyles. As George puts it "[i]f 
women, and infants, and children, and the elderly, and 
those who live almost everywhere else besides western 
societies are routinely excused for doing what would 
normally be considered wrong, in practice this relegates 
them to a nwral underclass of beings who, because of 
their natures or cultures, are not capable of being fully 
moral. "3& This leads her to suggest that the moral tradition 
which has this implication is one which is designed to 
serve only the most privileged class of hlJlrulIls. 
The point that vegetarianism can be more easily 
realized by persons in industrialized countries has been 
made elsewhere. As Beardsworth and Keil put it: "[t]he 
conditions in which contemporary voluntary vegetar­
ianism can flourish are located not only in a cultural 
climate of nutritional pluralism. They also rest on the 
economic foundations ofan affluent, consumer-oriented 
economy which can draw upon a vast array of food 
items, freed by the channels of international trade from 
the narrow limits of locality, climate and season."39 
George adds to this point a concern with the gender 
dimensions of the vegan ideal. 
The claim that George makes, based on these points, 
is that the traditional arguments for animal rights and 
animal welfare or liberation are tainted by bias. I do 
not want to enter into the debate concerning the accuracy 
of the nutritional literature on which George bases her 
critique-some of that debate can be found in Gary 
Varner's article "In Defence of the Vegan Ideal."4o 
Suffice it to say that George thinks her analysis is well 
grounded in contemporary scientific studies and 
analysis, but her critics disagree. 
I do want to suggest that George's critique has 
interesting implications for a utilitarian defense of 
vegetarianism. The critique would have some relevance 
for a reassessment of rights-based theories, but it is less 
clear what the implications would be. Certainly, 
consequentialist utilitarianism has to take seriously the 
potential consequences of advocacy of universal 
vegetarianism and veganism. If there is sufficient 
substance to the claim that the vegan ideal is 
discriminatory due to the ecological, economic and 
nutritional factors outlined by George, then that has to 
be takcn into account. Utilitarians need to consider the 
potential effects of their prescriptions on everyone 
concerned. It docs seem somewhat arbitrary to limit 
the evaluation to only Western, industrialized societies. 
There has been an ongoing critique of environmental 
ethics generally, for its shortsightedness and 
ethnocentrism. It seems that George's work, if nothing 
else, has raised the concern that animal rights theory 
might have to address a similar critique. 
v 
Karen Warren's and Lori Gruen's ecofeminist 
perspectives on ethics would seem to lead to a position 
on the treatment of animals that converges with Carol 
Adam's position derived from feminist critical theory 
and feminist theology. They would all recommend 
vegetarianism as a feminist statement against patriarchal 
dominance. Josephine Donovan details the kinds of 
actions and policies concerning the treatment ofanimals 
that she thinks are entailed by the feminist rejection of 
either/or thinking, or epistemological dualism. She says 
feminists should reject the following: camivorism, the 
killing of animals for clothing, hunting, the trapping of 
wildlife for fur, factory farming, use of lab animals for 
testing of beauty and cleaning products, rodeos, and 
circuses. Feminists must work to abolish the "animal­
industrial complex," in other words.41 Additionally, 
feminists must support efforts to replace medical 
experiments by computer models and tissue culture and 
support the drastic redesigning of zoos. As she puts it, 
"[a]ll of these changes must be part of a feminist 
reconstruction of the world."42 
From lhe perspective of moral philosophy and the 
question of the choice of ethicallheory, it is significant 
that the list of recommended actions and policies 
provided by Peter Singer or Tom Regan or other 
adherents of either utilitarian or rights-based theories 
would not differ significantly from that presented by 
Donovan. Thus, for many proponents of the anti­
domination ethic the prescriptive import of a feminist 
approach resembles that of traditional ethical theories, 
but the crucial difference lies in how one argues for 
those recommended actions or policies. 
Notes 
I This paper was initially titled "Feminist Arguments for 
and against Vegetarianism: Response to Nicholas Dixon's 'A 
Utilitarian Argwnent for Vegetarianism'." It was prepared for 
the Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals sessions held 
in Chicago, Illinois, on April 27, 1995. I have revised and 
expanded that original paper. 
2 Nicholas Dixon, in his conclusion, acknowledges that 
Frey's admonitions to combine private decision with political 
Between the Species 102 Summer & Fall 1995 
Wellington: Response 
action are well taken. In a sense, I see my paper as beginning 
where his left off. I wanted to explore the implications of 
feminism for the specific issue and also for moral reasoning 
in general. I do wish to state, nonetheless, that his paper 
provides an exemplary illustration of the merits of traditional 
ethical theorizing. When it is very well done, as his paper 
certainly is, it is certainly still worth doing. 
3 It has become increasingly clear that it is not really 
possible to speak of il feminist perspective, or the feminist 
approach. 'Ibere are myriad potential variants, or versions, of 
feminism. Some of these can be grouped in broad clusters, 
such as "cultural" feminism or "socialist" feminism or 
"liberal" feminism, but these labels have limited usefulness. 
Even within these broad clusters, there is as much diversity 
as there is between and among them. 
4 AGallup Poll in Britain in 1995 found that the percentage 
of Britons who are self-defined vegetarians had doubled 
since 1984 to 4.5 per cent and that "[wlomen were almost 
twice as likely as men to be vegetarian." The Economist, 
August 19, 1995,20. Beardswurth and Keil report that in the 
1990 Gallup study, "the combined group of vegetarians plus 
red meat avoiders was 10.0 per cent, compared with ... 4.0 
per cent in 1984" (at 255-256). In that same study, 12.8 per 
cent of female respondents "claimed to eat meat rarely or not 
at all," whereas the figure for men was 7.1 per cent. Thus, the 
gender difference has been continuous. See "The Vegetarian 
Option: Varieties, Conversions, Motives and Careers," by Alan 
Beardsworth and Teresa Keil, The Sociological Review, 1992, 
253-293 at 256. Age plays an important role, since young 
women are the most likely of all to be vegetarian. One in 
eight young women in Britain "professes vegetarianism." The 
Economist, August 19, 1995,20. 
5 This is the title of an article by Alan Beardsworth and 
Teresa Keil, supra. It does give the impression that 
vegetarianism is, in effect, a lifestyle choice. What I want to 
suggest in this paper is that for many ecofeminists, it is much 
more than a question of lifestyle choice. 
6 Some recent examples include the following: Carol 1. 
Adams, The Sexual Politics ofMeat: A Feminist- Vegerarian 
Critical Theory, Continuum, 1990. Carol 1. Adams and 
10sephine Donovan, editors, Women and Animals: Feminist 
Theoretical Explorations, Duke University Press, 1995. Greta 
Gaard, editor, Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature, Temple 
University Press, 1993 (the papers by Lori Gruen and Carol 
1. Adams specifically). See also Carol J. Adams and Marjorie 
Procter-Smith, "Taking Life or "Taking on Life"?," in Carol 
1. Adams, editor, Ecofeminism and the Sacred, Continuum, 
1993. Michael Allen Fox has written about the influence of 
feminist thought on his defense of vegetarianism and critique 
of environmental ethics. See his "Environmental Ethics and 
the Ideology of Meat Eating," Between the Species: A Journal 
ofEthics, Volume 9, 1993. 
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7 Carol J. Adams, "The Feminist Traffic in Animals," at 
196. In Gaard, ed., Ecofeminism, Animals, Nature. 
8 Both Lori Gruen and Carol J. Adams discuss their 
frustrations when "proposals to make feminist events cruelty­
free have been rejected. Both mention an incident involVing 
the June 1990 convention of the National Women's Studies 
Association, in which "the Coordinating Council rejected the 
Ecofeminist Task Force recommendation that it "make a 
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compensate for the nutritional deficit that would 
allegedly result from giving up meat and people, Reply: 
especially those in developing countries, who cannot 
Feminism and Utilitarian 
Arguments 
for Vegetarianism: 
A Note on Alex Wellington's 
"Feminist Positions on Vegetarianism" 
Nicholas Dixon 
Alma College 
Alex Wellington bas provided an invaluable survey of 
feminist arguments for and against vegetarianism. My 
utilitarian defense of vegetarianism was intended to 
preclude neither rights-based nor feminist justifications. 
Its goal, rather, was to show that the least controversial 
ground for vegetarianism--one that extends moral 
concern to nonhumans on the basis of their ability to 
suffer and feel pleasure-is sufficient to respond to two 
well-known defenses of meat eating. 
Whereas most of the feminist philosophers whom 
Wellington discusses reach similar conclusions to those 
ofmy utilitarian argument, or else disagree because they 
reject traditional utilitarian or rights-based frameworks, 
one of them-Kathryn Paxton George-raises an 
objection that is directly relevant to my utilitarian case. 
George argues that certain biological facts about women 
and ecological and economic realities about the poor 
and people who live in some developing countries 
would make the demand Ihat they become vegetarians 
unfairly hurdensome. If George has her empirical data 
right, then, as Wellington correctly ohserves, utilitarian 
advocates of vegetarianism may have to carve out wide 
exceptions to the demand that we all become 
vegetarians. Women who lack the resources to 
DISCUSSION 
fmd affordable nonmcat sources of protein would be 
excused if vegetarianism would cause them more 
suffering than is currently inflicted on the nonhuman 
animals that they eat. 
However, contrary to Wellington's claim that such 
limitations on the argument for vegetarianism would 
be "somewhat arbitrary," they are perfectly compatible 
with a utilitarian approach. The most famous utilitarian 
vegetarian ofall, Peter Singer, concedes that his argument 
may not apply to Eskimos, whose only available source 
of protein is meat.} A consistent utilitarian must take 
into account all relevant consequences, and, while it 
may make the morality of meat eating more complex, 
it is not at all arbitmry to recognize crucial differences 
between men and women and between industrialized 
and developing countries. The fact that utilitarianism 
avoids blanket moral judgments that ignore vital 
distinctions between different cases is one of it~ great 
adviUltages as a moral theory. 
A similar response applies to George's concern that 
the utilitarian argument for vegetarianism would brand 
women and inhahitant~ of developing countries as a 
"moral underclass" of people who are unable to fulfill 
the duty to be vegetarian. The key point is that 
utilitarianism would impose no such duty in the first 
place on any people for whom vegetarianism would be 
unduly burdensome, in that their sacrifices in refraining 
from eating meat would be greater than the harm 
currently caused by their meat eating. Hence neither 
women, poor people, nor inhabitants of developing 
countries would be condemned to being unable to fulfJlI 
their moral duties, and the charge that the utilitarian 
argument for vegetarianism serves only "the most 
privileged class ofbumans" is unfounded. 
So, even ifGeorge's empirical claims are supported 
by the evidence, they do not undermine the utilitarian 
case for vegetarianism. A utilitarian can consistently 
relativize the duty to refrain from eating meat to those 
on whom it would not impose an unfair burden. 
Notes 
I Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd. Edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 62. 
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